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Who Owns Bitcoin? Private Law Facing 
the Blockchain 
by Matthias Lehmann* 
ABSTRACT 
Blockchain, or “distributed ledger technology” (DLT), has 
been devised as an alternative to the law of finance. While it has 
become clear by now that regulation in the public interest is 
necessary—for example to avoid money laundering, drug dealing, 
or tax evasion—the particularly thorny issues of private law have 
been less discussed. These include, for instance, the right to 
reverse an erroneous transfer, the ownership of stolen coins, and 
the effects of succession or bankruptcy of a bitcoin holder. All of 
these questions require answers from a legal perspective because 
the technology does not answer them. 
Particular difficulties arise when one tries to apply a 
property analysis to the blockchain. Surprisingly, it is far from 
clear how virtual currencies and other crypto assets are 
transferred and acquired. The traditional requirements posed by 
private law, such as an agreement between the parties and the 
transfer of possession, are incompatible with the technology. 
Moreover, the idea of a “void” or “null” transfer is hard to 
reconcile with the immutability that characterizes the 
blockchain. 
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Before any such questions can be answered, it is necessary to 
determine the law governing blockchain transfers and assets. 
This is the point where conflict of laws, or “private international 
law,” comes into play. Conflicts lawyers are used to submitting 
legal relations to the law of the country with the most significant 
connection. But seemingly insurmountable problems occur 
because decentralized ledgers with no physical connecting factors 
do not lend themselves to this type of “localization” exercise. 
The issue of this paper therefore is: How can blockchain be 
squared with traditional categories of private law, including 
private international law? The proposal made herein avoids the 
recourse to a newly fashioned “lex digitalis” or “lex 
cryptographica.” Rather, it is suggested that the problems can be 
solved by using existing national laws, supplemented by an 
international text. At the same time, the results produced by DLT 
should also be accepted as legally protected and corrected only 
where necessary under the applicable national rules. In this way, 
a symbiosis between private law and innovative technology can 
be created. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By now, virtually everybody has heard about the blockchain, 
or “distributed ledger technology” (DLT), as it is called among 
professionals. Claims that DLT is about to change the world or 
trigger a new informational revolution may have been greatly 
exaggerated.1 What the technology offers is a mechanism for the 
                                                          
 1. Cf., e.g., Interview by Rik Kirkland with Don Tapscott, CEO, Tapscott 
Grp. (May 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/technology-media-and 
-telecommunications/our-insights/how-blockchains-could-change-the-world 
[https://perma.cc/N7HS-RDNS] (explaining how blockchains could 
“revolutionize the world economy”); Andrew Gazdecki, Five Ways Blockchain 
Could Change the World, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites 
/forbestechcouncil/2018/09/07/five-ways-blockchain-could-change-the 
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transfer of assets between two parties at any place in the world 
with an internet connection.2 Importantly, its use is not limited 
to the transfer of virtual currencies and other crypto assets, but 
can also extend—through so-called tokenization—to objects of 
the physical world, such as gold, land, or stocks.3 The main 
advantage of DLT is that it dispenses with the necessity of trust 
between the parties and sharply reduces the need for 
intermediaries.4 This is the result of three hallmark features of 
DLT: pseudonimity, resilience, and immutability.5 
Pseudonymity denotes that although each transfer is recorded 
on a ledger that is open to the public, the identity of the parties 
to the transfer is not revealed.6 The resilience of DLT stems from 
the fact that the ledger is distributed over a large number of 
nodes that cannot be easily attacked at the same time.7 Finally, 
immutability means that the transfers cannot be undone once 
they have been recorded on the blockchain.8 
As is by now equally well-known, DLT raises a number of 
legal problems, such as the possibility of money laundering, drug 
and arms dealing, terrorism financing, and the circumvention of 
                                                          
-world/#1f4b831273d7 [https://perma.cc/6937-RQU4] (providing five examples 
of the revolutionary nature of blockchains). 
 2. See PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE 
LAW: THE RULE OF CODE 2 (2018) (explaining blockchains and their potential 
role in the modern economy). 
 3. See Joshua A. T. Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 826–827 
(2014) (describing how ownership in commodities, land, and stock might be tied 
to coins within a blockchain). 
 4. See Adrian Blundell-Wignall, The Bitcoin Question: Currency Versus 
Trust-Less Transfer Technology 7 (OECD Working Papers on Finance, 
Insurance and Private Pensions, No. 37, 2014) (arguing that cryptocurrencies 
avoid the need for a trusted third party); Fairfield, supra note 3, at 814 
(emphasizing that trustless public ledgers can avoid the enormous costs of 
generating trust). 
 5. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 134 (“blockchains can store 
records in a tamper-resistant, resilient, and nonrepudiable manner.”). 
 6. See id. at 38 (“[B]lockchains make it possible for a person to store 
information or engage in transactions without revealing one’s true identity.”). 
 7. See id. at 36–37 (explaining how the distributed nature of blockchains 
makes them resilient and tamper-resistant). 
 8. See id. at 37 (describing the “nonrepudiable” nature of all transaction 
data stored on a blockchain: “[O]nce a transaction occurs on a blockchain-based 
network, parties subject to that transaction will have a hard time denying 
involvement.”). 
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embargoes.9 Much ink has been spilled on these problems.10 This 
contribution deals with an issue that has been less studied: the 
private law rules that underpin a DLT transfer. It tries to 
answer a couple of fundamental questions: Who owns the 
transferred assets? How can a transfer be reversed in case of a 
mistake or fraud? What are the legal consequences if the code is 
hacked and the virtual assets are stolen? What happens in case 
of death or bankruptcy of the bitcoin holder? 
In the world of physical objects, the answers to these 
questions are found in private law. Property law in particular 
enumerates exhaustively the methods by which ownership may 
be transferred from one party to another. It imposes certain 
conditions, such as an agreement between the present and the 
prospective owner.11 DLT neither requires nor ensures that such 
an agreement exists.12 It merely relies on the fulfillment of 
technological requirements, namely the use of the correct 
private and public key.13 The result produced by DLT may thus 
clash with classic private law. 
On a meta-level lies an even more fundamental problem: the 
determination of the national law applicable to the transfer. For 
each and every transaction, a governing national law must be 
identified.14 As DLT is a global and virtual transfer mechanism, 
it is impossible to identify the state which has the closest 
connection to it. The underlying difficulty is that the technology 
                                                          
 9. See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES – KEY 
DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL AML/CFT RISKS 17 (2014), http://www.fatf 
-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and 
-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf. 
 10. See, e.g., Lawrence Trautman, Virtual Currencies Bitcoin & What Now 
After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2014) 
(exposing the links of virtual currencies to numerous types of crimes); Kevin V. 
Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the 
Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271 (2015) (arguing for a holistic technology 
specific regulation to combat risks of virtual currencies); Sarah Hughes & 
Stephen T. Middlebrook, Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: 
Current Issues and Future Directions, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813 (2014) 
(discussing enforcement actions by U.S. legislators and regulators). 
 11. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY CONCISE EDITION 426 
(2nd ed. 2017) (describing the agreement between a seller and a bona fide 
purchaser at common law). 
 12. See infra Section A.2. 
 13. See, e.g., DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 14–15 (introducing the 
concept of public-private key encryption). 
 14. See PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 (5th ed. 2010) (describing 
choice of law in a property law context). 
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is completely delocalized and a-national, while the law is first 
and foremost made on the national level. Therefore, trying to 
identify the law applicable to DLT seems like putting a square 
peg in a round hole.15 
This article is organized in the following way: The first part 
will show why private law is relevant for the blockchain 
although it has been devised as an alternative mechanism to the 
law. It will outline the numerous types of legal questions that 
arise and to which precise answers are needed. On the other 
hand, one must not ignore the specificity of DLT, which produces 
technically irreversible transfers in a decentralized manner 
without being connected to a particular state. The second part 
will demonstrate that these specificities pose obstacles to the 
application of classic concepts of private law. The third part 
suggests a way to reconcile the technology with the law and 
combine them into a meaningful whole. The fourth part will 
address counterarguments and complications, such as the 
problems of succession and bankruptcy. The fifth part concludes. 
A. DOES CODE NEED LAW? 
1. A GLOBAL TRANSFER MECHANISM WITHOUT A LEGAL BASIS 
DLT is often presented as an alternative to legal solutions. 
It was originally designed to surmount the shortcomings of the 
trust-based banking system that gives banks and states a 
prominent role.16 Satoshi Nakamoto, the pseudonym used in the 
original bitcoin proposal, saw these institutions as being 
inherently corrupt.17 His goal was to eliminate the need for them 
by creating a peer-to-peer system in which transactions are 
recorded by a decentralized network of computers rather than 
intermediaries.18 
                                                          
 15. See infra Section B.3. 
 16. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 
BITCOIN.ORG https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2019) (calling for 
“an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, 
allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without 
the need of a trusted third party.”). 
 17. See Primavera De Filippi & Benjamin Loveluck, The Invisible Politics 
of Bitcoin: Governance Crisis of a Decentralised Infrastructure, 5 INTERNET 
POL’Y REV. 1, 4 (2016) (“Bitcoin aimed at eradicating corruption from the realm 
of currency issuance and exchange.”). 
 18. See id. (“Bitcoin is often presented as an alternative monetary system, 
capable of bypassing most of the state-backed financial institutions. . . .”). 
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The philosophical underpinnings of the blockchain stand in 
sharp tension to the rule of law. Anarchists, like “cypherpunks” 
and “crypto rebels,”19 are attracted to DLT because they see 
autonomous cryptocurrencies as a safeguard of civil liberties 
against a Big Brother state.20 The idea also appeals to 
neoliberals because it might toll the bell for the state’s monopoly 
to create money.21 For both ends of the political spectrum, the 
right-wing and the left-wing, DLT is essential to reduce the role 
of the government and its rules.22 The anti-legalistic tendency is 
epitomized in the formula “code is law,” which was coined by 
Lawrence Lessig, albeit with precisely the opposite intention: to 
demonstrate that the state should intervene in the internet’s 
architecture.23 Some authors maintain that the blockchain 
                                                          
 19. See generally Eric Hughes, A Cypherpunk’s Manifesto, ACTIVISM.NET 
(Mar. 9, 1993), https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto. 
html [https://perma.cc/KR2Y-CZG4] (“[P]rivacy in an open society requires 
anonymous transaction systems . . . an anonymous system empowers 
individuals to reveal their identity when desired and only when desired. . . .”). 
The Cyperpunk’s Manifesto builds on the earlier Crypto Anarchist Manifesto 
by Timothy C. May. See Timothy C. May, The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, 
ACTIVISM.NET (Nov. 22, 1992), http://groups.csail.mit.edu 
/mac/classes/6.805/articles/crypto/cypherpunks/may-crypto-manifesto.html 
[https://perma.cc/6GEG-58Y8] (predicting new technologies that will “alter 
completely the nature of government regulation, the ability to tax and control 
economic interactions, [and] the ability to keep information secret. . . .”). 
 20. For the story of “crypto rebels” beating the government and “Big 
Brother,” see generally STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT 
THE GOVERNMENT SAVING PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2001) (describing 
various instances of individuals who succeeded in protecting personal data from 
the government using cryptography). 
 21. See, e.g., Nikolei Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital 
Currency, and the Case Against its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUM. L. REV. 111, 
171 (2012) (“Allowing bitcoin to operate unfettered by substantial regulation 
allows it to contribute toward job creation, economic growth, and opportunity.”). 
Neoliberals have long argued for the need of a currency that is independent 
from the state, see FRIEDRICH AUGUST HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY: 
THE ARGUMENT REFINED 133–34 (3rd ed. 1990) (arguing for a “Free Money 
Movement” to overcome central-bank-induced inflation). 
 22. See, e.g., Scott H. Kimpel, House of Representatives Approves Bipartisan 
Blockchain Bill, THE HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH BLOCKCHAIN BLOG, 
https://www.blockchainlegalresource.com/2019/10/house-of-representatives 
-approves-bipartisan-blockchain-bill/ (describing a blockchain bill with 
bipartisan support in the U.S. House of Representatives). 
 23. Lawrence Lessig, Code Is Law, HARV. MAG. (Jan. 1, 2000), https:// 
harvardmagazine.com/2000/01/code-is-law-html (last visited Dec. 5, 2019); see 
also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 1–8 (2006) (arguing that absent 
some state regulation cyberspace will become a tool of control). 
100 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 21:1 
 
would be governed by a non-state and a-national law for the 
digital age, which they call lex cryptographica.24 
A quick look at the technology seems to confirm the idea that 
code is indeed replacing the law: DLT permits to transfer assets 
on the internet without any intervention by banks or other 
intermediaries that can be controlled by the state.25 A DLT 
transfer is initiated when the transferor enters a unique digital 
key that is only known to him (a “private key”) as well as the 
publicly known key of the transferee (a “public key”) to a chain 
of digital signatures on the internet.26 The transfer is then 
broadcast via a unique “hash” (a string of numbers) to computer 
servers (so-called “nodes”), which verify the validity of the keys 
and the conformity to the previous transfers in the chain.27 Each 
of the nodes maintains its own copy of all transfers (the “ledger”) 
against which it checks the new transfer.28 The nodes work on a 
decentralized basis and are dispersed around the world 
(therefore “distributed ledger”).29 The nodes are assigned a “fee” 
to incentivize them to perform the verification work.30 Their 
verification effort results in the addition of a new block to the 
chain (therefore “blockchain”). Once it is proven that enough 
work has been invested into the verification process, the longest 
blockchain—representing the decision of the majority of nodes—
will be accepted by all others.31 From this moment, the chain can 
no longer be altered without redoing all the verification work 
                                                          
 24. See Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain 
Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia 48 (Mar. 10, 2015), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 (last visited Mar. 28, 2018) (describing lex 
cryptographica as “a set of rules administered through self-executing smart 
contracts and decentralized (and potentially anonymous) organizations.”). See 
also DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 52 (claiming that with lex 
cryptographica “national laws get pushed to the edges”). 
 25. See De Filippi & Loveluck, supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 26. Nakamoto, supra note 16, at 2; (“We need a way for the payee to know 
that the previous owners did not sign any earlier transactions.”). 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. at 3 (“New transactions are broadcast to all nodes.”). 
 29. See id. at 3–4 (explaining how such a decentralized system operates). 
 30. See id. at 4 (explaining how this fee structure incentivizes network 
support). 
 31. Id. at 2 (“[W]e need a system for participants to agree on a single history 
of the order in which they were received. The payee needs proof that at the time 
of each transaction, the majority of nodes agreed it was the first received.”). 
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that has been done, which becomes even more difficult as new 
blocks are added.32 
This whole process is independent of any legal rules. The 
transfer comes about by the transferor combining its private key 
with the public key of the transferee and the following 
confirmation of the transfer through the verification process.33 
None of this requires the intervention of notaries, lawyers, or 
intermediaries that could be supervised, e.g. banks, clearing 
agents, or depositories.34 Nor does it need a contract, or any 
other legal agreement or act. In this sense, the characterization 
of code as law seems to be entirely fitting. 
2. PRIVATE LAW PROBLEMS THAT MAY ARISE FROM DLT 
TRANSFERS 
Although many consider DLT as independent from the law 
or an underpinning legal system, they nevertheless seem to 
assume that the technology yields legally binding results. For 
instance, it is very often said that the recipient of a transfer 
becomes the “owner” of the bitcoin,35 or that concepts such as 
“ownership” and “property” would also apply to 
cryptocurrencies.36 Statements like these presuppose that DLT 
transfers have some effect on the level of property law. But it is 
wholly unclear whether bitcoin and other virtual currencies can 
indeed be conceptualized as property from the point of view of 
                                                          
 32. See id. at 3 ( “To modify a past block, an attacker would have to redo 
the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then catch up with and 
surpass the work of the honest nodes.”). 
 33. See id. at 2 (explaining how transactions incorporate private and public 
keys). 
 34. See De Filippi & Loveluck, supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 35. See Kaplanov, supra note 21, at 123 (“[O]wner transfers her bitcoins to 
the purchaser. . .”); Sarah Meiklejohn et al., A Fistful of Bitcoins: Characterizing 
Payments Among Men with No Names, IMC’13 - PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH 
ACM CONFERENCE ON INTERNET MEASUREMENT 127 (2013) (“[B]itcoin can be 
thought of as a chain of transactions from one owner to the next. . . .”) (emphasis 
in original). Kevin V. Tu, Perfecting Bitcoin, 52 GA. L. REV. 505, 548 (2017) 
(“Owners access, manage, and use their virtual currency with digital keys.”). 
 36. See Michael Abramaowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 
359, 414 (2016) (claiming that a legal system’s refusal to allow cryptocurrency 
ownership “would be self-defeating”); Shawn Bayern, Dynamic Common Law 
and Technological Change: The Classification of Bitcoin, 71 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. ONLINE 22, 29 (2014) (calling direct ownership of bitcoin “a new class of 
private property”); Fairfield, supra note 3 at 842–54 (suggesting to 
reconceptualize property law as the “law of information” in order to cover virtual 
assets like cryptocurrencies). 
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the common law.37 An even more problematic but often neglected 
point is that one cannot assume the blockchain is exclusively or 
predominantly subject to the common law.38 Given the division 
of the world into different states with diverging legal systems, 
each and every form of property exists by virtue of its recognition 
under some applicable national law.39 It is first necessary to 
identify this law through the mechanics of conflicts of law before 
it can be applied to any phenomenon of the real or virtual world. 
To blockchain enthusiasts, the search for an applicable 
property law is anathema.40 They consider DLT as guaranteeing 
the position of the acquirer with absolute certainty, something 
that a real-world transaction with tons of documentation, 
lawyers, and courts cannot provide.41 From their point of view, 
the technology does not need law.42 
Yet this belief is wrong. Blockchain is designed to avoid 
“double spending,” i.e. that the same owner transfers the bitcoin 
twice. It provides no safeguards at all against other problems 
                                                          
 37. See Tatiana Cutts, Bitcoin Ownership and its Impact on Fungibility, 
COINDESK (June 14, 2015, 3:00 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin 
-ownership-impact-fungibility (claiming that there is “a good policy reason for 
the conclusion that one cannot, in a private law sense, ‘own’ bitcoin”); Kelvin F. 
K. Low & Ernie G. S. Teo, Legal Risks of Owning Cryptocurrencies, 1 HANDBOOK 
OF BLOCKCHAIN, DIGITAL FINANCE, AND INCLUSION 225–47 (2018) (stating that 
“it is not entirely clear what, if any legal rights, attach to bitcoins and other 
private cryptocurrencies like bitcoin”); Bayern, supra note 36, at 25–29 (arguing 
that “owning” Bitcoin may be a contract right rather than a property right). 
 38. See Low & Teo, supra note 37, at 9 (“It may come as a shock . . . but 
there is no such thing as digital money as a matter of law.”); Bayern, supra note 
36, at 33–34 (explaining that Bitcoin “does not fit neatly into classical 
categories” of common law). 
 39. See generally Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 73, 84–85 (1985) (“It is not enough, then, for the property claimant 
to say simply, ‘It’s mine’ through some act or gesture; in order for the ‘statement’ 
to have any force, some relevant world must understand the claim it makes and 
take that claim seriously.”). 
 40. Bayern, supra note 36, at 25 (questioning the meaning of “hold[ing] a 
bitcoin”). 
 41. Cf. Fairfield, supra note 3, at 29–31 (explaining that courts often rely 
on imprecise and unhelpful distinctions, such as physicality, causing them to 
wrongly apply intellectual property law to digital objects, thereby denying the 
appropriate protections of law). 
 42. See May, supra note 19 (predicting that developments in information 
technology such as cryptographic protocols “will alter completely the nature of 
government”); Hughes, supra note 19 (“Even laws against cryptography reach 
only so far as a nation’s border and the arm of its violence.”). 
2019] WHO OWNS BITCOIN? 103 
 
that may occur.43 The following provides some illustrations of 
such problems. In order to get a better overview, they will be 
divided into those that are endogenous, i.e. inherent to the 
transaction, and those that are exogenous, i.e. rooted in events 
outside the blockchain.44 
a) Endogenous Transfer Problems 
Many problems inherent to the transaction may plague a 
DLT transfer. One of them is that the transferor may have made 
a mistake.45 He might, for instance, have entered the wrong 
number of bitcoin, e.g. “10” instead of “1.” It is also conceivable 
that the transferor’s assent to the bitcoin transfer was induced 
by fraud or material misrepresentation because the transferee 
has made false allegations to induce the transferor to use its 
private key. Furthermore, it is possible that the transferor acted 
under the influence of an improper threat by the transferee, 
thereby forcing her to make the transfer. This is by no means a 
farfetched possibility, given that many online blackmailers 
today demand payment in bitcoin, e.g. in exchange for 
abstaining from the publication of private information on the 
internet.46 
From a legal point of view, in all of these situations the 
contract that entails the property transfer is voidable.47 Yet 
                                                          
 43. See, e.g., Low & Teo, supra note 37, at 22 (explaining the blockchain 
protocols “only promise to prevent double-spending”); see also Nakamoto, supra 
note 16, at 1 (proposing “a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-
to-peer distributed time stamp server . . . .”). 
 44. See PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & GREG MCMULLEN, GOVERNANCE OF 
BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS: GOVERNANCE OF AND BY DISTRIBUTED 
INFRASTRUCTURE 16 (2018), https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr 
/hal-02046787/document (explaining the difference between endogenous and 
exogenous rules). 
 45. See generally DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 44 (explaining “it 
can be difficult to unwind the transaction retroactively” if bitcoin is sent to the 
wrong address). 
 46. See Cristina Miranda, How to Avoid a Bitcoin Blackmail Scam, 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION BLOG (Aug. 21, 2018), https:// 
www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2018/08/how-avoid-bitcoin-blackmail-scam 
[https://perma.cc/Z7F6-J8MT] (describing a scheme in which payments in 
bitcoin were extorted from men in exchange for silence about an alleged affair). 
 47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 153, 164, 175 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981) (providing that a contract made under the influence of a mistake, 
fraud, or an improper threat is voidable). 
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under the blockchain, the transfer is effective.48 For an effective 
transfer, it suffices that the correct codes have been used.49 
Transfers of bitcoins are recorded as long as the correct private 
key of the transferor is combined with an existing public key of 
a transferee.50 The technology does not take into account 
mistakes, fraud, or improper threats.51 These are not part of the 
algorithm. 
Even worse, the cryptocurrency transfer is also effective 
where it is not supported by any agreement at all. This may 
occur where the transferor or the transferee has been subject to 
some strong form of incapacity, for instance, because they suffer 
from a mental illness or defect.52 One must also not discard the 
possibility that the parties to the transfer have never been in 
contact.53 For example, the transferor could have confused the 
public key of the transferee with that of another person. Or the 
transferee could hack the computer of the transferor, copy his 
private key, and used it to transfer to bitcoin to himself. In these 
cases, no contract has been concluded between both sides.54 Yet 
from a technological point of view, the transfers would be 
effective.55 
b) Exogenous Transfer Problems 
Exogenous events are those that have no relation to the 
blockchain but nevertheless have the potential to impact the 
                                                          
 48. See, e.g., DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 21 (explaining the 
validity of Bitcoin transactions with the aid of a private key); accord Meiklejohn, 
supra note 35, at 2 (describing the basic Bitcoin protocol). 
 49. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 2 and the accompanying text. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 4 (noting that the technology requires regulations to prevent it 
from being used for criminal and illicit activities). 
 52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(providing that a person has no capacity to incur contractual duties if his 
property is under guardianship by reason of an adjudication of mental illness 
or defect). 
 53. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 38–39 (explaining that 
blockchain technology allows transactions to occur without the parties to the 
transaction revealing their true identity or trusting each other as long as both 
parties “trust the underlying technical infrastructure”). 
 54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17, 18, 22 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981) (providing that a contract requires mutual assent on behalf of both 
parties to the contract, and that the manifestation of mutual assent be in 
relation to the manifestation of the other). 
 55. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra 2 and the accompanying text. 
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ownership of crypto assets.56 One salient example is succession 
or inheritance law. In most legal systems, in case of death the 
assets of the decedent are vested in their entirety in the heirs or 
the executor of a will.57 This transfer is automatic and not 
conditioned on any transmission of possession or other act. 
Arguably, it also includes any cryptocurrency that the decedent 
had acquired.58 Since the decedent is no longer able to dispose of 
these coins, his successors must have become the “owners” 
outside of the DLT.59 The question is how and under which 
national law does this transfer happen legally. 
Exogenous problems may also occur in case of bankruptcy. 
Typically, the bankruptcy trustee steps into the shoes of the 
debtor and acquires the right to dispose of all of the latter’s 
assets in order to satisfy the creditors.60 This power arguably 
extends to virtual assets, such as bitcoin, which can make up a 
                                                          
 56. See DE FILIPPI & MCMULLEN, supra note 44, at 16 (explaining 
exogenous rules). 
 57. See e.g., M.J. de Waal, Law of Succession, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW 
OF SOUTH AFRICA 169 (C.G. Van der Merwe & J.E. Du Plessis eds., 2004) 
(describing the transformation of South African law from the Roman-Dutch 
concept of universal succession to the English system of executorship); HENRY 
DYSON, FRENCH PROPERTY AND INHERITANCE LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 
313 (1st ed. 2003) (explaining the vesting of the decedent’s assets in her lawful 
heirs under French law); WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN JR., SHELDON F. KURTZ & 
DAVID M. ENGLISH, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, INCLUDING TAXATION AND 
FUTURE INTERESTS, 4TH 49–133 (4th ed. 2010) (outlining intestate succession 
and effects of wills); Catherine Rendell, Payment of Expenses, Debts, and 
Pecuniary Legacies, in LAW OF SUCCESSION 193 (Catherine Rendell ed., 1997) 
(describing the devolution of the decedent’s assets on his personal 
representative under English law). 
 58. See, e.g., Ana-Caterina Anitei, Digital Inheritance: Problems, Cases and 
Solutions, INT’L. CONF. EDUC. & CREATIVITY. FOR A KNOWLEDGE-BASED SOC’Y. 
32 (2017) (characterizing bitcoin as part of the “digital inheritance”); Naomi 
Cahn, Probate Law Meets the Digital Age, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1697, 1702–05 
(2014) (considering bitcoins as “digital assets” subject to probate law); L. A. G. 
M. van der Geld, De Executeur in een Nalatenschap met Bitcoins en Andere 
‘Digitale Bezittingen’, 8 TIJDSCHR. ERFRECHT 122 (2014) (discussing the 
executor’s obligation to search for digital assets of the deceased, such as bitcoin, 
under Dutch law. This article was among the first to discuss the problem of 
inheritance of digital assets). 
 59. For an example of such inheritance under Dutch law, see Anna Berlee, 
Digital Inheritance in the Netherlands, 6 J. EUR. CONSUMER & MARKET L. 256 
(2017). 
 60. See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE 
OF BANKRUPTCY: UNDER THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF 1898 AND ITS AMENDMENTS 
42 (3rd ed. 1922) (“Property, wherever situated, which is not exempt, passes to 
and vests in the trustee...”). 
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sizeable proportion of the debtor’s wealth. Furthermore, many 
legal systems endow the bankruptcy trustee with the power to 
avoid transactions made before the opening of the bankruptcy 
proceedings that favor particular creditors over others.61 To 
achieve its goal of protecting the bankruptcy estate against 
fraudulent, biased, or suspect transfers by the debtor, this power 
must also extend to bitcoin and other virtual currency 
payments.62 The treatment of cryptocurrencies in bankruptcy 
proceedings is the subject of intense legal discussion.63 
Independently of the correct characterization, it should be clear 
that crypto assets are part of the debtor’s estate and, as such, 
must be used for the benefit of his creditors. 
3. INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION 
The problems discussed, whether they are endogenous or 
exogenous to the blockchain, affect the private relationships 
between individuals. They concern the parties to a bitcoin 
transfer, but also third parties such as the heirs or creditors of a 
holder of crypto assets. None of these issues are taken into 
account by the functioning of DLT. The blockchain largely 
ignores them. Real-life problems like mistake, duress, death, or 
bankruptcy are not solved by decentralizing a ledger in which 
transactions are recorded. In all of these cases, a rational 
outcome cannot be ensured without the intervention of the law. 
                                                          
 61. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2012) (giving the trustee the right to avoid certain 
transfers made by the debtor). 
 62. See, e.g., Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, HashFast 
Technologies LLC v. Lowe (In re HashFast Technologies LLC), No. 14-30725-
DM, (Bnkr  N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016) (granting, in a partial summary judgment, 
recovery of the value of the bitcoin at the time of the transfer to the defendant, 
in which case the bankruptcy trustee of the plaintiff sought to recover 3000 
bitcoin that had been paid to the defendant before the plaintiff had gone into 
administration). 
 63. See, e.g., David E. Kronenberg & Daniel Gwen, Bitcoins in Bankruptcy: 
Trouble Ahead for Investors and Bankruptcy Professionals?, 10 PRATT’S J. 
BANKR. L. 112, 116 (2014) (categorizing bitcoin as “property” for the purposes 
of the Bankruptcy Code); Chelsea Deppert, Bitcoin and Bankruptcy: Putting the 
Bits Together, 32 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 123 (2015) (defending a 
characterization as “currency”). The courts differ on whether bitcoin can be 
considered as property or currency, see United States v. Petix, 2016 WL 7017919 
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2016) (holding that bitcoin is not money in the ordinary sense 
of the term); United States v. Mansy, 2017 WL 9672554 (D. Maine May 11, 
2017) (stating that the court is not persuaded by the reasoning in United States 
v. Petix). 
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B. CODE’S RESISTANCE TO THE LAW 
To solve the problems mentioned, one could simply try to 
apply the concepts, principles, and rules of private law to DLT. 
This would entail determining for each and every operation on 
the blockchain the applicable national law and checking whether 
its requirements for the transfer of property are fulfilled. Yet 
such a legalistic approach cannot overcome the gap between law 
and technology. There are several stumbling blocks that stand 
in its way. 
1. THE AUTONOMY OF THE BLOCKCHAIN VIS-À-VIS NATIONAL 
LAW 
The first obstacle on the road to applying the law to DLT is 
its autonomy. The technology operates independently from the 
law.64 It is also impossible for the law to impose its requirements 
on the blockchain.65 
The problem is well illustrated by the case of stolen bitcoin 
that a thief transfers to his own public key.66 Legally, this 
transfer should be invalid given that the holder of the bitcoin has 
never agreed to it.67 But when the correct codes are entered and 
broadcast to the nodes, a new private key is created for the 
recipient in about ten minutes, the average time to confirm a 
bitcoin transaction.68 This private key gives the transferee the 
factual power to dispose of the crypto currency despite the fact 
that there was no legal basis for the transfer.69 Though the 
                                                          
 64. See Fairfield, supra note 3, at 809 (discussing the insulation and 
autonomy of blockchain property). 
 65. See discussions supra Part A.1. 
 66. See, e.g., Joey Garrison, 2 Men Arrested in Elaborate Plot to Steal $550K 
in Cryptocurrency by Hacking Social Media Accounts, USA TODAY, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/11/15/massachusetts-men 
-arrested-plot-steal-cryptocurrency-bitcoin-social-media-threats/4201763002/ 
[https://perma.cc/B62X-GTFS] (last updated Nov. 15, 2019, 3:19 PM) (reporting 
examples of stolen bitcoins); Michael Kaplan, Hackers are Stealing Millions in 
Bitcoin—and Living Like Big Shots, NY POST (Apr. 13, 2019, 2:43 PM), 
https://nypost.com/2019/04/13/hackers-are-stealing-millions-in-bitcoin-and 
-living-like-big-shots/ [https://perma.cc/G3EN-6ZUM] (reporting examples of 
stolen bitcoins). 
 67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS supra note 47 and the 
accompanying text. 
 68. See How Long Does It Take to Transfer Bitcoins and Why?, COINSUTRA, 
https://coinsutra.com/bitcoin-transfer-time/ (last updated Aug. 6, 2019) 
(explaining why it takes ten minutes to confirm a transaction). 
 69. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 2 and the accompanying text. 
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recipient cannot be considered the “owner” of the bitcoin in a 
legal sense, he has obtained the ability to transfer via the 
blockchain. It is impossible to prevent him from exercising this 
power by, for example, sending the bitcoin to a third party. Any 
transfer made by him leads to the creation of a new private key 
in the transferee’s favor, who can be anywhere on the planet. 
This new key can then be used again to create a further new 
private key for anybody in the world, and so on. The process is 
legally unstoppable. 
Another illustration of the blockchain’s resistance to the law 
is the hypothetical of succession. Let us imagine “A,” dying 
intestate with his private key stored on an office computer to 
which his employer has exclusive access. Legally, all of A’s assets 
belong to his estate.70 Yet factually, the employer has the private 
key in his possession, which gives her unlimited power to send 
the crypto currency to anybody she wants. The legitimate heir or 
executor of the will, in turn, is unable to dispose of the crypto 
asset as he lacks the private key. There is no way to obtain it 
other than via the blockchain. The technology resists accounting 
for the death of the bitcoin holder because the event takes place 
outside of the blockchain. 
What emerges in these cases is that the divide between law 
and technology cannot be easily overcome. DLT is a self-
contained mechanism that works autonomously and is shielded 
from outside influences. A transfer of crypto assets is effective 
on the blockchain whenever the private and public keys are 
used, and only in this case. For this reason, the hacker who 
obtained bitcoins illegally can dispose of them, whereas an heir 
or executor who is legally entitled to them cannot. To make DLT 
compatible with the law would require a complete 
reconceptualization of the technology. This cannot be done under 
the protocol in its current form. 
2. THE IRREVERSIBILITY OF BLOCKCHAIN TRANSFERS 
One could attempt to avoid the clash between technology 
and the law by “correcting” the blockchain after a transfer is 
executed. Instead of requiring title or property as a condition of 
transfer, one might, for instance, consider the transfer made by 
the thief to himself in the example above as being invalid. As a 
                                                          
 70. See MCGOVERN ET. AL., supra note 57, at 8 (defining “estate” as the 
property of the decedent). 
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consequence, the newly added block of the chain would have to 
be deleted and the original owner and victim of the theft would 
have to be reinstated as the rightful holder of the bitcoin. The 
same procedure could be used where someone other than the 
heir of the bitcoin holder or the executor of his will disposes of 
his assets. In other words, the blockchain would be changed 
subsequent to the transfer in such a way as to restore the parties 
to their original positions. 
Such a corrective approach would, however, be inhibited by 
another feature of the blockchain: its immutability or 
“nonrepudiability.”71 Once a transfer has been added to the 
chain in the form of a block, the information can no longer be 
removed technologically. The chain has been transformed 
forever and can only be accepted by other nodes as such. Every 
transfer on the blockchain is, therefore, immutable, which is one 
of the major reasons why DLT is particularly tamper-proof and 
can dispense with trust.72 
One must partially qualify the characterization of 
blockchain transfers as immutable. There are a great variety of 
DLT networks, which represent different trade-offs in terms of 
reversibility and finality of transactions.73 They can be roughly 
divided into permissioned and permissionless networks.74 
Permissionless systems are those in which anybody can 
                                                          
 71. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 37 (stating that the data 
stored on the blockchain is nonrepudiable). 
 72. See discussion supra Part A.1. 
 73. See, e.g., Xiwei Xu et al., A Taxonomy of Blockchain-Based Systems for 
Architecture Design, IEEE INT’L CONF. ON SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE 246 
(2017), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7930224/ (last visited Mar 26, 2018); 
Richard Gendal Brown, A Simple Model to Make Sense of the Proliferation of 
Distributed Ledger, Smart Contract and Cryptocurrency Projects (2014), 
https://gendal.me/2014/12/19/a-simple-model-to-make-sense-of-the 
-proliferation-of-distributed-ledger-smart-contract-and-cryptocurrency 
-projects/ (last visited Mar 27, 2018); Tim Swanson, Consensus-as-a-service: a 
Brief Report on the Emergence of Permissioned, Distributed Ledger Systems 12–
14 (April 6, 2015), available at: http://www.ofnumbers.com/wp-content 
/uploads/2015/04/Permissioned-distributed-ledgers.pdf. 
 74. See Xu et al., supra note 73 at 246 (describing permissioned and 
permissionless blockchain as two design options for blockchains). Cf. Till 
Neudecker & Hannes Hartenstein, Network Layer Aspects of Permissionless 
Blockchains, 21 IEEE COMM. SURV. & TUTORIALS 838, 838 (2019) 
(characterizing permissionless systems as unstructured peer-to-peer networks 
that typically rely on the consensus of the participants, not a central operator). 
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participate and where consensus is thus highly distributed.75 In 
contrast, permissioned systems feature one or more authorities 
that act as gatekeepers.76 They allow participants into the 
network and sometimes also confirm transfers.77 In a 
permissioned system of the latter type, i.e. one with confirmation 
powers limited to some nodes, it is relatively easy to reverse a 
transaction with the help of the authorities in charge.78 Yet 
reversals are also not unthinkable in other types of permissioned 
and even in permissionless systems.79 They are effectuated by 
creating a so-called hard fork that splits the blockchain protocol 
in two. This happened, for example, to the Bitcoin network when 
it was reorganized in 2013,80 and with the Ethereum network 
after a considerable amount of the cryptocurrency was siphoned 
off by hackers in 2016.81 In both instances, a new version of the 
blockchain was created. While the case of Bitcoin seems to have 
been relatively unproblematic, in the case of Ethereum, the old, 
hacked ledger refused to die, which resulted in the parallel 
existence of two separate currencies: Ethereum (One) and 
Ethereum Classic.82 
The example of Ethereum illustrates that a reversal of the 
blockchain comes at a hefty price. Two parallel versions of the 
same ledger are far from ideal and may lead to many problems. 
Those who have invested in the “dying” ledger are deprived of 
the “real” cryptocurrency. All other participants will be confused 
                                                          
 75. See Neudecker & Hartenstein, supra note 74 and the accompanying 
text. 
 76. See Xu et al., supra note 73, at 245 (“[A] blockchain may be 
permissioned in requiring that one or more authorities act as a gate for 
participation.”). 
 77. See id. (including permission to “join the network . . . , permission to 
initiate transactions, or permission to mine”). 
 78. Cf. Swanson, supra note 73, at 26 (discussing permissioned blockchains 
and accountability for reversals). 
 79. See, e.g., id. at 21 (noting reversal possibility in a permissionless 
blockchain such as Bitcoin). 
 80. See Vitalik Buterin, Bitcoin Network Shaken by Blockchain Fork, 
BITCOIN MAG. (Mar. 12, 2013, 11:14 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com 
/articles/bitcoin-network-shaken-by-blockchain-fork-1363144448/ (“Starting 
from block 225430, the blockchain literally split into two . . . . For the next six 
hours, there were effectively two Bitcoin networks . . . .”). 
 81. See Eduard Gómez, The Ethereum Hard Fork & Ethereum Classic, 
MERKLE (July 21, 2016), https://themerkle.com/the-ethereum-hard-fork 
-ethereum-classic/ [https://perma.cc/4PRJ-X59G].  
 82. See Low & Teo, supra note 37, at 19. 
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by the parallel existence of two versions of the same ledger.83 
Both effects undermine trust in the cryptocurrency. It is hard to 
overestimate the negative repercussions since the value of the 
cryptocurrency depends first and foremost on trust.84 Therefore, 
a hard fork is not a viable option except for the most extreme and 
rare cases, such as the discovery of a major hack that corrupts a 
very large number of transfers. For all other purposes, undoing 
a DLT transfer is impracticable. 
3. THE A-NATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE BLOCKCHAIN 
Another problem that stands in the way of applying law to 
the blockchain is that before one could do so, it would first be 
necessary to determine which national law applies. The rules of 
private law are mainly made at the level of the state. Since the 
world is split into states with differing rules of private law, there 
is no such thing as a global law for private transactions. In order 
to assess any blockchain transfer in legal terms, one must, 
therefore, first determine the applicable national law. This is the 
task of conflict of laws, or “private international law” as it is 
called in many parts of the world.85 Conflict of laws works by 
attributing sets of facts or “relations” to the law of the state with 
which it has the closest connection.86 DLT presents a formidable 
challenge for this methodology. 
The blockchain is a global or “transnational” transfer 
mechanism that has little to no connections with any particular 
state. Transfers are executed on the basis of private and public 
keys without determining the location of the parties.87 The 
                                                          
 83. Id. 
 84. See supra note 4 and the accompanying text. 
 85. See, e.g., HAY ET. AL., supra note 14, at 1 (defining conflict of laws as 
“the body of law that aspires to provide solutions to international or interstate 
legal disputes between persons or entities other than countries or states as 
such”) (emphasis in original); See also JAMES FAWCETT & JANEEN CARRUTHERS, 
CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Peter North 
ed., 14th ed. 2008) (explaining that private international law “comes into 
operation whenever the court is faced with a claim that contains a foreign 
element”). 
 86. See FAWCETT & CARRUTHERS, supra note 85, at 682 (explaining the 
“most closely connected” test for determining which law governs in 
international contract law); HAY ET. AL., supra note 14, at 16–18 (providing a 
background of Savigny’s theory of the seat); See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (regarding the applicable law for torts). 
 87. See Nakamoto, supra note 16, at 2 (illustrating the transaction process 
with respect to public and private keys). 
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protocols are stored on computers worldwide. Anybody can 
participate in permissionless systems like Bitcoin for there is no 
authority or server that controls access.88 Confirmations take 
place through distributed consent from nodes all over the 
world.89 It is thus not exaggerated to say that permissionless 
systems are completely de-nationalized and not connected to any 
particular country, which makes it impossible to determine the 
state with the closest connection. 
A further problem is that most conflict-of-laws systems 
provide different rules for different types of relations. They 
distinguish between contracts, torts, property, and succession, 
to name but a few.90 To fit the blockchain technology into of one 
of these categories is challenging, to say the least. On the one 
hand, there is clearly a transactional aspect to blockchain in the 
cases where the transfer is accompanied by an agreement 
between the transferor and the transferee.91 On the other hand, 
a property law analysis may also seem apposite because the 
coins or other assets encrypted on the blockchain often have 
market value and can be assimilated to goods which are the 
object of property law.92 
Let us consider for a moment the implications of one or the 
other qualification. A contractual qualification would lead to the 
principle of party autonomy, according to which the parties to a 
contract can freely select the law applying to their agreement.93 
                                                          
 88. See Xu et. al., supra note 73, at 245 (explaining that permissionless 
systems are completely open to new users). 
 89. See id. at 244 (explaining that nodes in a network validate transactions 
and propagate them to their peers, potentially around the globe). 
 90. See, e.g., HAY ET. AL., supra note 14, at 147–49 (explaining that subject 
matter characterization of the legal dispute at issue is “the natural and 
necessary starting point for the analysis of any conflicts case.”). 
 91. Some authors therefore speak of the “transactions on a blockchain.” See 
DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 6 (describing the function of blockchain 
protocols in regard to transactions on a blockchain). 
 92. See Fairfield, supra note 3, at 843 (describing goods as property). 
 93. See Russell J. Weintraub, Functional Developments in Choice of Law 
for Contracts, 187 HAGUE ACAD. COLLECTED COURSES ONLINE 239, 271 (1984) 
(describing party autonomy as “perhaps the most widely accepted private 
international law rule of our time”). The principle has, for instance, been 
recognized in Commission Regulation 593/2008 of 17 June 2008, On the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 10, art. 3(1) 
[hereinafter Rome I]. See also Hō no Tekiyō ni Kansuru Tsūsokuhō [Act on the 
General Rules of Application of Laws], Law No. 78 of 2006, art. 7 (Japan), 
translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law 
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If followed strictly, this principle would allow the parties to 
choose the law applying to the transfer. As a result, a great 
variety of different laws would govern DLT. A different law could 
apply to each transfer recorded on the chain, depending on the 
choice made by the individual parties. This would be 
incompatible with the coherence of the chain. Also, the law that 
the transferor and the transferee have chosen would be 
unknown from the perspective of other participants, except 
where this choice had been coded into the blockchain, which is 
highly unusual and not easy from a technical point of view. 
One could instead embed a central choice of law in the 
protocol of the cryptocurrency. The chosen law would then 
govern all transactions with the digital asset.94 Yet it is very 
unlikely that such a choice of a national law would be made 
because it is contradictory to the explicit anti-legal philosophy 
underlying Bitcoin.95 Such a choice is incompatible with the 
ideals of crypto aficionados,96 and is therefore unlikely to be 
                                                          
/detail/?id=1970 (providing that “[t]he formation and effect of a judicial act shall 
be governed by the law of the place chosen by the parties at the time of the act”); 
Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht [IPRG] [Federal Act on 
Private International Law] Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art. 116 (Switz.) [hereinafter 
Swiss PILA] (stating that “[i]n matters involving an economic interest, the task 
of establishing foreign law may be assigned to the parties”); GRAZHDANSKII 
KODESK ROSSIISKOI FEDERASTII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 1210 (Russ) 
(providing that parties who enter into a contract “may select by agreement 
between them select [sic] the law that will govern their rights and duties under 
the contract”) (http://en.smb.gov.ru/support/regulation/ccpart3/); Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheheguo Shewai Minshi Falvguanxi Shiyongfa (中华人民共和国涉
外民事关系法律适用法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Application of 
Law in Foreign-related Civil Relations] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, effective April 1, 2001), Chap. 6, art. 41 
(China), translated in 2010 CHINA LAW LEXIS 3009 (stating that “[t]he parties 
may select by agreement the law applicable to a contract”); Inter-American 
Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, Org. Am. St., art. 
7, Mar. 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 732 (stating that “[t]he contract shall be governed 
by the law chosen by the parties”); Hague Conf. on Priv. Int’l L. [HCPIL], 
Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, art. 2 § 1, 
(Mar. 19, 2015) (stating that “[a] contract is governed by the law chosen by the 
parties.”). 
 94. This option has been envisaged by the Financial Markets Law 
Committee (FMLC). See Distributed Ledger Technology and Governing Law: 
Issues of Legal Uncertainty, FIN. MKTS. L. COMITY Mar. 2018, at 15 [hereinafter 
FMLC], http://www.fmlc.org/dlt-and-governing-law.html (last visited Mar. 27, 
2018) (considering the law chosen by the network participants for the DLT 
system as “elective situs”). 
 95. See May, supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra Section A.1. 
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made. Moreover, it would give a single state plenary power over 
the blockchain, which lends itself to abuse. Applying one 
national law exclusively may be appropriate for some 
permissioned systems that are backed up by one or several 
authorities sitting in a certain country, yet it seems 
inappropriate for permissionless systems that are open to the 
whole world and not connected to any particular state. 
In case no law has been chosen, a contractual qualification 
would lead to the applicability of default conflicts rules. Many 
legal systems point to the law at the habitual residence of the 
party that is to perform the characteristic obligation as the law 
governing contracts in the absence of a choice.97 But such a 
default rule would not work for the anonymous transfers on the 
blockchain, in which neither the identity nor the address of the 
transferor is known. 
These difficulties in applying classic conflict rules for 
contracts point to a larger problem: These rules are designed for 
the exchange of goods or services between parties that know 
each other, not for pseudonymous transfers of crypto assets in a 
computer system. It is not even justified to assume that a DLT 
transfer is supported by an agreement, since it can also be the 
result of a mistake or coercion.98 In this sense, a contract 
conflicts-of-laws analysis creates many issues that are 
insurmountable. 
If one instead characterizes crypto transfers as property, the 
law that would normally apply is the lex rei sitae, which is the 
law of the state where the object of the property right—“the 
thing”—is located.99 Such a locational exercise would be all but 
impossible for a virtual object stored in the blockchain. These 
objects “exist” only in the ledger that is distributed among 
numerous computers around the world. The simple truth is that 
a bitcoin has no geographical home and is impossible to locate. 
There are, however, variations and adaptations of the lex rei 
sitae rule that one could attempt to follow. For instance, many 
states apply the so-called PRIMA rule for incorporeal securities, 
which refers to the law in force at the place of the relevant 
                                                          
 97. See Rome I, supra note 93, at art. 4(1), (2); Swiss PILA, supra note 93, 
at art. 117. 
 98. See supra Section A.2.b. 
 99. See, e.g., HAY ET. AL., supra note 14, at 1253–54 (applying the law of the 
situs to tangible moveable property). 
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intermediary.100 This approach could be used, e.g., for 
permissioned systems without an explicit choice of law. One 
could submit them, e.g., to the law of the relevant operator, even 
though its role is not precisely the same as that of an 
intermediary administering “accounts” of securities.101 But 
while such an approach may perhaps work for permissioned 
systems, it is not feasible in a permissionless environment, 
which gives no special status to any of the participants spread 
around the world. The PRIMA rule therefore does not fit 
blockchains such as those for Bitcoin.102 
A third route between contract and property could be to use 
the conflict-of-laws rules for assignment. Assignment is a special 
technique whereby the assignor transfers a nonphysical claim to 
the transferee.103 It is usually effectuated by a simple agreement 
between both parties. Once perfected, the transfer of the claim 
is effective against third parties, such as creditors of the 
transferor or competing transferors.104 Hence, assignment can, 
to a certain extent, be assimilated to the transfer of property in 
intangible objects. The conflict-of-laws rules that apply to 
assignment are, however, notoriously uncertain and oscillate 
between different solutions, such as applying the law in force at 
the domicile of the transferor, the law governing the assignment, 
or the law underlying the claim.105 Moreover, any analogy 
                                                          
 100. Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect 
of Securities Held with an Intermediary art. 4, adopted July 5, 2006, 17 T.I.A.S. 
401. The Convention has been signed by the United States and Switzerland. 
 101. FMLC, supra note 94, at 18–19 (suggesting two approaches: the Place 
of the Relevant Operating Authority/Administrator (PROPA) approach or the 
Primary Residence of the Encryption Private Master Key Holder (PREMA) 
approach). 
 102. See id. at 11 (noting that the lex situs does not translate well when 
applied to a DLT ledger). 
 103. See, e.g., HAY ET. AL., supra note 14, at 1279–81 (discussing the 
assignment of intangibles). 
 104. See id. at 1280–81 (discussing assignment for the benefit of creditors). 
 105. See, e.g., Harry C. Sigman & Eva-Maria Kieninger, The Law of 
Assignment of Receivables: in Flux, Still Uncertain, Still Non-Uniform, in 
CROSS-BORDER SECURITY OVER RECEIVABLES 1, 43–74 (Harry C. Sigman & 
Eva-Maria Kieninger eds., 2009) (discussing various solutions to determine the 
law applicable to assignment); AXEL FLESSNER & HENDRIK VERHAGEN, 
ASSIGNMENT IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLAIMS AS 
PROPERTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S “ROME I PROPOSAL” 77–78 (2006) 
(defending the application of the law chosen by the parties to the assignment ); 
Francisco Garcimartín Alférez, Assignment of Claims in the Rome I Regulation: 
Article 14, in ROME I REGULATION: THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL 
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between blockchain and assignment is bound to fail because the 
scope of application of the blockchain is much wider than that of 
assignment. Besides incorporeal claims, it can be used to 
transfer virtual assets, like cryptocurrencies, or intellectual 
property rights, e.g. copyrights in pictures. One can even employ 
DLT to transfer physical assets, whether movables or 
immovables, through tokenization.106 These assets are very 
different from claims and call for different conflict rules. 
In sum, none of the received conflict-of-laws solutions lends 
itself to DLT. This problem is fundamental because it stands in 
the way of developing new substantive rules that are specific to 
the blockchain. Proposals such as those to reconceptualize 
property law107 or to recognize bitcoin as a new kind of 
property108 are built on the implicit assumption that a certain 
national law governs the blockchain (often the common law). Yet 
they fail to address the primary question of how this law is 
determined, or which version of the common law they mean, and 
why it is this and not another national law that applies. A set of 
substantive rules that could eliminate conflicts issues and 
govern the blockchain as a whole would have to be global in 
scope. We are, however, far away from having such a law. In fact, 
it is nowhere in sight. 
C. HOW TO RECONCILE DLT AND PRIVATE LAW 
The law that applies to blockchain transfers and the 
resulting positions presents a conundrum. In the following, a 
proposal will be made. Before doing so, this article will explain 
the outer constraints that every proposal must respect regarding 
the application of private law to DLT. 
1. UNDERPINNINGS OF THE PROPOSAL 
Any suggestion for combining the blockchain with private 
law must take into consideration all three problems that have 
been identified in the preceding section: the autonomy of DLT, 
the immutability of transfers, and the a-national character of the 
blockchain. What is needed is a mechanism that respects the 
                                                          
OBLIGATIONS IN EUROPE 217, 217 (Franco Ferrari & Stefan Leible eds., 2009) 
(discussing the impact of Rome I on the law applicable to assignment). 
 106. See Fairfield, supra note 3, at 826–27. 
 107. Id. at 842–63. 
 108. See Bayern, supra note 36, at 29. 
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result of bitcoin transactions—in particular, one that does not 
try to reverse them and press them into the Procrustes bed of 
national law—while at the same time responds to the 
requirements of private justice. In addition, such an approach 
should not require the elaboration of uniform global rules, which 
at the moment seem elusive. Instead, it should be fully 
compatible with the division in national laws that currently 
exists. 
The forthcoming proposal respects all four conditions. It 
suggests an application of the law that respects the autonomy of 
DLT, the immutability of transfers and abstains from imposing 
one national law on the whole blockchain, all without requiring 
the development of new global rules. Even though this may seem 
like a perfect solution, the proposal risks coming under fire from 
both the proponents of the technology as well as from lawyers, 
because it is based on certain underpinnings that either of them 
may dislike. To reduce this risk, these fundamental 
underpinning shall be disclosed in the following. Basically, the 
proposal is driven by two convictions for which it should not be 
attacked. 
The first conviction is that the blockchain is a useful 
innovation that can yield significant societal benefits and should 
therefore be allowed to continue to flourish.109 DLT provides a 
stable, nonrepudiable and largely tamper-proof mechanism to 
transfer assets around the world. In the great majority of cases, 
and provided it is not abused for illegal purposes, it works 
perfectly without the law.110 This is an advantage that should be 
maintained. The attractiveness of DLT would greatly suffer if 
lawyers tried to change the code. Even indirect changes should 
be avoided, such as a requirement to include a choice of law in 
the blockchain, for these changes would gravely compromise the 
functioning of DLT. 
The second conviction is that code is not law and that the 
positions obtained on the blockchain cannot be the end point of 
                                                          
 109. See, e.g., Fairfield, supra note 3, at 874 (characterizing DLT as trustless 
ledgers tracking transactions in real time at comparatively low cost). 
 110. At the end of the third quarter of 2019, a total number of 311,396 
Bitcoin daily transactions were recorded world-wide. See Number of Daily 
Bitcoin Transactions from 1st Quarter 2016 to 3rd Quarter 2019, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/730806/daily-number-of-bitcoin 
-transactions/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). This number contrasts with the very 
few instances in which legal problems or disputes have arisen. 
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ownership analysis but instead require supplementation and 
additions. Though it works in the majority of cases, in 
exceptional situations the law must correct the result achieved 
by the use of DLT. This article has identified above the instances 
of mistake, fraud, and improper threat, but also those of theft, 
bankruptcy and succession. From a legal point of view, all of 
these circumstances require a solution different from that of the 
blockchain. As the technology does not provide it, the law must 
step in. It should do so not by invalidating the transfer—
something which would be technologically unfeasible. Instead, 
another means must be established to achieve a balanced and 
just result. 
In sum, there is undeniably a tension between the law and 
the blockchain. Nevertheless, they must be reconciled if one 
shares the two convictions just outlined. The thesis of the 
following proposal is that the blockchain and private law are not 
mutually exclusive but can exist beside each other. Law and 
technology must neither ignore nor fight one other. They should 
live in a symbiosis with each leaving to the other its own field of 
competence. 
2. ACCEPT DLT AS A FACT 
The first step of the new solution is that the law should not 
interfere with the blockchain. The technology should essentially 
continue to function as it currently does without the law and 
without the intervention of lawyers. Transfers should be done on 
the basis of private and public keys only. Any introduction of 
legal conditions or requirements should be omitted. 
This means that the law should not question the validity of 
blockchain transactions. This would be a hopeless enterprise 
anyway. The power of the holder of bitcoin resides in his 
knowledge of the private key. This and the public key of the 
recipient is all that is needed to initiate a transfer. To call such 
a transfer “invalid” from a legal point of view would not change 
the factual power of the private key’s holder to initiate a new 
transfer, which will then result in a corresponding power of the 
recipient, and so on. Importantly, this result comes about by 
technology, not by the law. The legal system is unable to avoid 
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the passing on of crypto assets, and it should not try to inhibit 
it.111 
Instead, the immutability of the transfer from a technical 
point of view is a fact that lawyers must accept. Choosing to 
ignore it would come at the cost of failing to provide a solution 
that is workable in real life. 
One may compare the situation to that of a cash payment: 
The transfer in this case comes about by a factual element, the 
delivery of one or more banknotes or coins. The law accepts and 
confirms the transfer because the transferee becomes the owner 
of the banknote from a legal perspective. This is not the case 
where an agreement supporting the transfer is lacking, e.g., 
because the money has been stolen. Yet even a thief can provide 
title to cash to a bona fide creditor.112 The fact that he possesses 
the notes or coins allows him to transfer title to a transferee in 
good faith. The original owner keeps his title and can demand 
the cash back only as long as the illegal possessor has not spent 
the money.113 
A similar type of legal analysis should also be applied to 
DLT. The entry into the blockchain is a fact that reveals the 
current holder of the crypto asset. This position allows him 
factually and legally to procure title to another recipient. In 
order to determine this power, it is unnecessary to investigate 
the validity of the previous transactions recorded on the 
blockchain. Specifically, one should not go back in time by 
conducting a “title search” to find out whether the transferor had 
a position she can transfer, and her predecessor, and so on. As 
in the case of cash, such a title search is counterproductive 
because of the fungibility of coins and their function as means of 
                                                          
 111. See WRIGHT & DE FILIPPI, supra note 2 at 184 (stressing that any 
attempt by the government to introduce a technological backdoor or other access 
control on both hardware and software makes the technology weaker). 
 112. See Miller v. Race, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401 (“[I]n the case of money 
stolen, the true owner can not recover it, after it has been paid away fairly and 
honestly upon a valuable and bona fide consideration . . . ”); see also 
Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Long, 318 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (denying 
restitution of money that a bank robber had paid to tax authorities); Atlantic 
Cotton Mills v. Indian Orchard Mills, 17 N.E. 496, 501 (Mass. 1888) (“There is 
no doubt that a thief may use stolen money . . . to pay his debts, and in such 
case an innocent creditor may retain the payment.”). See generally Andrew Kull, 
Defenses to Restitution: The Bona Fide Creditor, 81 B.U. L. REV. 919, 937 (2001) 
(providing further cases and commentary on stolen money used for debts). 
 113. Miller v. Race, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401 (“[B]ut before money has 
passed in currency, an action may be brought for the money itself . . . . ”). 
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payment. Lawyers should not second-guess the blockchain by 
controlling each and every transfer, either giving it their stamp 
of approval or denying its validity. This approach would make 
DLT essentially useless; it would become an expensive record 
system without any practical value. One should therefore accept 
the record on the blockchain as a fact which creates the power to 
transfer. This also means that those that have obtained a private 
key via DLT should, without any showing to the contrary, be 
seen as the legitimate holders of the crypto asset. As such, their 
position deserves to be protected by the law.114 
An exception should apply only where it can be proven that 
the crypto asset has been obtained illegally, in particular by 
hacking, blackmailing, or fraud. In these cases, the presumption 
of a legal effect is rebutted. The exceptional situation is similar 
to that of a stolen banknote and will be dealt with in more detail 
later.115 Apart from such an event, a transfer on the blockchain 
should be accepted as such. 
3. FOCUS ON THE REVERSE TRANSACTION 
The fact that transfers recorded on the blockchain cannot be 
undone does not mean, however, that one would have to consider 
the situation as presented by the blockchain as final.116 Though 
it is impossible to delete a block once it has been added to the 
chain, the law can reverse the effects of such transfer. The means 
for doing this is ordering a reverse transfer.117 For instance, 
though the record of a transfer of bitcoin cannot be undone and 
deleted from the blockchain, the recipient of an erroneous 
transfer can be obliged to transfer the cryptocurrency back to the 
sender. The same obligation can be imposed on the party that 
has not effectuated its counter-performance under a transaction. 
                                                          
 114. See infra Section D1. 
 115. See discussion infra Section D1. 
 116. See Nakamoto, supra note 16, at 1, 8 (indicating that transactions will 
be computationally irreversible but that subsequent transactions can occur 
provided they satisfy the consensus mechanism of the DLT network). 
 117. For example, such reverse transfer may take the form of a judgment 
ordering replevin of stolen or fraudulently conveyed cryptocurrency. See Angela 
Morris, Judge Orders $ 30 Million in Bitcoin to Be Returned in Cryptocurrency 
Class Action, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV. (Aug. 3, 2017) (summarizing a default 
judgment against Project Investors Inc. in a class action case regarding stolen 
cryptocurrency); see also Leidel v. Project Inv’rs, No. 9:16-cv-80060-MARRA 
(S.D. Fla. July 27, 2017), ECF No. 123 (ordering a default judgment of 
11,325.0961 BTC against Project Investors Inc.). 
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Even in the case of hacking, blackmailing, or fraud, it makes 
sense to force the tortfeasor to return the illegally obtained 
assets because the ineffectiveness of the transfer from a legal 
point of view does not bestow a private key to the victim. The 
reverse transfer restores the parties to the same positions they 
had been in before the transfer. For all practical purposes, it 
cancels the effects of the first transfer. 
It is important in this context to note a certain ambiguity of 
the term “reversible.” Insofar as it means annulling a transfer 
as if it had never happened, it is not a workable option for most 
DLT networks. But insofar as it refers to a reverse transfer as a 
result of which a new private key is created for the victim, it is 
certainly feasible with the help of the law. The law cannot undo 
a fact, but it can provide remedies aiming to reverse the 
situation that had been achieved. What comes to the fore here is 
the difference between a set of facts and a normative order. The 
law as a normative order cannot undo a fact, e.g., a tort that has 
been committed, a document that has been handed over, or work 
that has been performed. Yet it can remedy the consequences of 
these facts rectroactively. Just as the effects of an unjust 
enrichment can be compensated by a restitution claim, the law 
can impose an obligation on the recipient of virtual assets 
recorded on the blockchain to return what has been received.118 
The idea of a reverse obligation to correct legally incorrect 
transfers marries the dominant features of the technology, its 
autonomy, and nonrepudiability, with the practical need for 
correcting unjust and societally unbearable results. This is 
achieved by imposing an obligation to return, which can be 
complied with by using the methods of DLT. In this way, the 
blockchain is not “invalidated” but supplemented with an 
additional reverse transfer. The reversal takes place in the form 
that the DLT provides and thus does not create any 
contradiction or upheaval. The law is adapted to the 
particularity of the technology to achieve its aims. 
Yet, there is a catch. The actual performance of the reverse 
transfer depends on the will of the recipient.119 He must make 
                                                          
 118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 
54(2)(a) (2008) (“Rescission requires a mutual restoration and accounting in 
which each party restores property received from the other, to the extent such 
restoration is feasible . . . .”). 
 119. See Andrew W. Balthazor, Comment, The Challenges of Cryptocurrency 
Asset Recovery, 13 FIU L. Rev. 1207 (explaining the challenges of recovering 
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use of his private key to send the crypto assets back to the 
sender. It is by no means sure that he will comply with his 
obligation.120 
But this peculiarity does not make the reverse transfer 
improbable or unlikely.121 The legal system has mechanisms to 
force the use of keys or any other human action. Examples 
include a court order and the obligation to pay a fine in case of 
its violation for “contempt of court.”122 Of course, these legal 
mechanisms are not as certain to succeed as would be the 
technical deletion of the transfer, which would restore the 
transferred asset directly to the former holder. Yet such a 
deletion is not possible, or only possible at a high cost.123 
Moreover, the obligation to use a private key to retransfer assets 
is not very different from other court orders, say, to restore a 
physical asset or perform another act, e.g., providing testimony 
as a witness. Legal enforcement works at least in many, if not in 
most, cases. The undeniable truth that the law is sometimes 
broken or disobeyed does not mean that it is useless to impose a 
normative order.124 
The consequences of the “reverse transfer approach” shall 
be illustrated using a practical example: Let us imagine that A 
wants to exchange a bitcoin in U.S. dollars and enters into an 
online transaction with B, who is a fraudster. A transfers the 
bitcoin via the blockchain to B, but B never transfers U.S. 
dollars. A court of law would order B to transfer the bitcoin back 
to A. If B does not comply, he will be in contempt of court and 
                                                          
cryptocurrency even when ordered by a court). See also Max I. Raskin, Realm 
of the Coin: Bitcoin and Civil Procedure, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 969, 
975 (2015) (explaining how the possessor of a cryptocurrency account’s private 
key has total control over the account). 
 120. See Balthazor, supra note 119, at 1219 (describing methods of enforcing 
judgements against defendants that hold cryptocurrency). 
 121. See id. at 1235 (“Cryptocurrency asset recovery poses challenges 
surmountable under the right conditions.”). 
 122. See id. at 1226 (“Cryptocurrency may be seized, pursuant to a levy or 
writ of replevin.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 70(e) (“The court may also hold the 
disobedient party in contempt.”). 
 123. See Nakamoto, supra note 16, at 8 (showing that for the bitcoin 
blockchain, it is computationally impractical to reverse a transaction without 
controlling the majority of computing power in the network). 
 124. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 113 (2005) (explaining that a 
law or norm is not invalidated by the existence of contrary behavior); see also 
H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 84 (2012) (distinguishing the normative 
rules of law from predictive language). 
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ordered to pay a fine. The same obligation to retransfer could be 
imposed on the recipient of cryptocurrency from a transferor who 
subsequently is declared bankrupt. If the transfer is done during 
the suspect period, the assets would have to be restored to the 
bankruptcy estate through a new transfer. 
4. STOP THINKING ABOUT PROPERTY TRANSFERS 
The essence of the proposal made here is to substitute a 
conceptualization of the transfer in terms of property law by an 
analysis that is based on remedies under the law of obligations. 
No longer is it necessary to enquire into the ownership of bitcoin 
or other cryptocurrencies. For the vast majority, the law accepts 
and protects the results produced by the blockchain. 
The abandonment of a property law analysis of the transfer 
has two main advantages. The first is that it is no longer 
necessary to probe and second-guess the validity of every DLT 
transfer. The distributed ledger is accepted as is. This not only 
allows the technology to operate without disturbances, it also 
spares the useless effort to “correct” the blockchain. 
The second advantage is that the holder of a private key 
whose bitcoin has been hacked or stolen can rely on the law’s 
protection. She is not obliged to prove title to the bitcoin by 
relying on circumstances outside of the blockchain, specifically 
that the person she obtained the coins from was the “owner” who 
legitimately obtained it from the former “owner” and so on. Such 
a parallel “title search” would indeed be impossible given the 
decentralized and pseudonymous working of DLT. The 
blockchain itself is the ledger that confers legitimacy. 
A further advantage becomes visible at the international 
level. Excluding a property analysis dispenses with the need to 
look for the one national law that governs the transfer. As has 
been shown above, it is impossible to identify such a law for 
completely distributed ledgers.125 In addition, it is also a futile 
analysis, as the law cannot in any sense “validate” a blockchain 
transfer. The “validity” is certified by technology. Its result 
cannot be annulled or voided by law.126 It is thus not only 
impossible, but also useless to search for the law that “governs” 
a transfer on the blockchain. There is no need for such law, as 
DLT is a factual and global process. 
                                                          
 125. See supra Section A.3. 
 126. See supra Section A.3. 
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The many legal questions raised by such transfers cannot be 
answered by one legal system, but only by a plurality of different 
laws. These laws concern, for instance, the right of the victim of 
a fraud or theft to have the assets returned, the obligation to 
restore assets transferred by mistake, or the fate of crypto assets 
in the event of the death or bankruptcy of their holder. Why 
should one national law govern all of these questions? It 
conforms much more to the current reality of split legal systems 
to answer these questions by simultaneously applying different 
national laws. 
Take the example of an agreement for the transfer of bitcoin. 
Such an obligation will usually only be undertaken against some 
consideration. The transfer is thus part of the performance of a 
contract. It is important to pay attention to the precise wording 
of the previous statement: The bitcoin transfer is not a contract 
but the performance of a contract. The transfer serves to fulfill 
an obligation arising under a contract concluded outside the 
blockchain, such as a sales contract for some object that is paid 
for in bitcoin. This contract is submitted to some national law in 
accordance with the ordinary rules of conflict of laws. The law 
governing the contract determines whether the agreement is 
invalid, e.g., in case of mistake. The same law will also determine 
the consequences if the transfer made in the contract’s execution 
has to be returned.127 Since the agreement is concluded outside 
the blockchain, it is not difficult to determine the contract’s 
governing law. This law is identified by the usual rules of private 
international law: in the case of a sale, for instance, the parties 
can agree to the applicable law to their contract;128 in the 
absence of a choice by the parties, many tribunals would apply 
the law of the habitual residence of the seller.129 
                                                          
 127. It is generally agreed that the law applicable to a contract also governs 
the consequences of its invalidity. See Rome I, supra note 93, at art. 12(1)(e) 
(“(1) The law applicable to a contract . . . shall govern in particular: . . . (e) the 
consequences of the nullity of the contract.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 221(1) (1971) (stating that rights and liabilities of the 
parties to a contract in actions for restitution are governed by the state law 
which “has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties 
under [choice-of-law principles].”); HAY ET AL., supra note 14, at 1218–22 
(providing a more nuanced discussion of the Second Restatement § 221). 
 128. See sources cited supra note 119 and the accompanying text. 
 129. See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheheguo Shewai Minshi Falvguanxi 
Shiyongfa (中华人民共和国涉外民事关系法律适用法) [Laws Applicable to 
Foreign-Related Civil Relations] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, effective April 1, 2001) art. 41 (China) (“Where 
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It is thus both easy and appropriate to apply the law 
governing a contract (if there is any) to the obligation to restore 
the crypto assets in case of nullity of that contract. Determining 
this law is easy because the contract is a phenomenon outside 
the blockchain. One can rely on the connecting factors supplied 
by the usual conflicts rules that point to circumstances beyond 
the chain, e.g., the choice of law by the parties or the habitual 
residence of one of them, to determine the law that governs the 
reversal obligation. It is not necessary to identify a law 
governing the blockchain as such. 
If there is no contract because, for instance, the transferor 
has been blackmailed into making the transfer, then the conflict 
rules for torts apply. Most legal systems in the world refer to the 
law in force at the place of the tort, the so-called lex loci delicti.130 
                                                          
the parties do not so select [the law applicable to a contract], the law of the 
habitual residence of the party whose performance of contractual obligations 
can most reflect the characteristics of the contract [shall govern].”); Hō no 
Tekiyō ni Kansuru Tsūsokuhō [Act on the General Rules for Application of 
Laws], Act No. 78 of 2006, art. 8(2), (translated in (Japanese Law Translation 
[JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1970 (“In 
the case [where the parties of a contract do not choose a governing law], if only 
one of the parties is to provide a characteristic performance involved in a 
juridical act, the law of the habitual residence of the party providing said 
performance . . . shall be presumed to be the law of the place with which the act 
is most closely connected.”); GRAZHDANSKII KODESK ROSSIISKOI FEDERASTII 
[GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 1211(1) (Russ.) (stating that the governing law is the 
law of the country in which the primary activity occurs or where the principle 
actor is located); Swiss PILA, supra note 93, at art. 117(1)–117(2) (“(1) Failing 
a choice of law, contracts are governed by the law of the state with which they 
have the closest connection [such as where the performing party habitually 
resides].”); Rome I, supra note 93, at art. 4(2) (“Where the contract [has not 
established jurisdiction through art. 4(1) or is covered by multiple parts of art. 
4(1)], the contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the party 
required to effect the characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual 
residence.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheheguo Shewai Minshi Falvguanxi 
Shiyongfa (中华人民共和国涉外民事关系法律适用法) [Laws Applicable to 
Foreign-Related Civil Relations] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2011) art. 44 (China) (“Tort 
liability shall be governed by the law of the place where the tort occurs.”); Hō 
no Tekiyō ni Kansuru Tsūsokuhō [Act on General Rules for Application of 
Laws], Law No. 78 of 2006, art. 17, translated in (Japanese Law Translation 
[JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp (Japan); GRAZHDANSKII 
KODESK ROSSIISKOI FEDERASTII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 1219(1) (Russ.) 
(stating that the law of the country where the action occurred applies); Swiss 
PILA, supra note 93, at art. 133(2) (describing how the law of the state where 
the tort occurred generally applies); Commission Regulation 864/2007, On the 
Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), pmbl. (15), 2007 O.J. 
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Challenging for this approach are cross-border torts, in which 
the damage and the harmful conduct occur in different countries. 
Some states give prominence to the place of damage.131 Others 
consider the place of conduct as more important, but make an 
exception where the tortfeasor could foresee that the conduct 
would have harmful effects in another country; in this case, they 
equally follow the law of the place of damage.132 A good case 
could be made that such damage occurs at the place of the 
victim’s domicile. The same result may be obtained using the 
governmental interest analysis that is followed by many states 
in the United States because arguably the country of residence 
of the victim has the strongest interest in regulating this tort.133 
The blackmailer would therefore be subject to the law of the 
victim’s country, which would oblige him to restore the crypto 
assets. 
In sum, it is unnecessary to analyze DLT transfers in terms 
of property law. Rather, the entries on the blockchain should be 
accepted as they are. This does not mean that they are conclusive 
with regard to the final distribution of crypto assets. Where they 
are the result of a void contract or a tort, the crypto assets must 
be restored under the applicable contract or tort law. The 
advantage of such an approach can hardly be overestimated. Not 
only does it avoid the need for title search for crypto assets and 
the factually impossible deletion of a transfer from the ledger, it 
also spares the vain search for the law applicable to the 
blockchain as such because it accepts the ledger for what it is: 
                                                          
(L 199) 40 [hereinafter Rome II] (“The principle of the lex loci delicti commissi 
is the basic solution for non-contractual obligations.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Hō no Tekiyō ni Kansuru Tsūsokuhō [Act on General Rules for 
Application of Laws], Law No. 78 of 2006, art. 17, translated in (Japanese Law 
Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp (Japan) (“The 
formation and effect of a claim arising from a tort shall be governed by the law 
of the place where the result of the wrongful act occurred.”); Rome II, supra note 
130, at art. 4(1) (“[T]he law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising 
out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs.”). 
 132. See GRAZHDANSKII KODESK ROSSIISKOI FEDERASTII [GK RF] [Civil 
Code] art. 1219(1) (Russ.) (“In cases when the action or other circumstances 
caused harm in another country, the law of that country may be applied if the 
person causing the harm foresaw or should have foreseen the onset of the harm 
in that country.”); Swiss PILA, art. 133(2) (“However, if the result occurred in 
another state, the law of such state applies if the tortfeasor should have foreseen 
that the result would occur there.”). 
 133. See HAY ET AL., supra note 14, at 808–22 (discussing governmental 
interest analysis and torts). 
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an autonomous, self-contained, global transfer mechanism. The 
technology is allowed to flourish and any doubling with a legal 
analysis is avoided. Consequently, no national law governs 
blockchain transfers, but rather the autonomous rules of the 
protocol, if need be, are supplemented with a remedy under an 
easily identifiable national law. 
D. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS AND COMPLICATIONS 
Every solution to a problem creates a heap of new issues. 
The proposal made here is no exception. The relinquishment of 
the traditional property analysis presents a challenge for classic 
legal thinking and will raise many eyebrows. These concerns 
deserve to be seriously addressed. 
1. THEFT WITHOUT OWNERSHIP? 
The first concern is whether abandoning a property law 
analysis foregoes the legal protections of crypto asset holders. 
Many authors see the need for submitting virtual currencies to 
property law to obtain such protection. For instance, Joshua 
Fairfield has called for a reconceptualization of property law as 
the “law of information” so as to allow it to cover intangible 
objects.134 Others have qualified Bitcoin as a “new class of 
private property”.135 An expert in criminal law has stressed the 
societal expectation that “cryptotheft” must not go 
unpunished.136 Uniting all of these statements is the conviction 
that the law must protect the holders of bitcoin and other crypto 
assets like traditional property owners. 
The demands for property or property-like protection are not 
at variance with the proposals made here. The above statement 
that one should replace the property analysis with a return 
obligation merely concerns the transfer of crypto assets. It does 
not preclude the holder of such assets being protected by the law. 
Indeed, such protection is indispensable if one seriously strives 
for a symbiosis between the legal and the technological 
perspective. If the blockchain is to be endowed with legal effects, 
the holder of bitcoin and other assets recorded must be shielded 
against hacking, fraud, extortion, and similar torts. This can 
                                                          
 134. Fairfield, supra note 3, at 849–54. 
 135. Bayern, supra note 36, at 29. 
 136. Henry S. Zaytoun, Cyber Pickpockets: Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, and 
the Law of Theft, 97 N.C. L. REV. 395, 401 (2019). 
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necessarily be done only by recognizing her position with some 
form of legal status. Such status is also necessary for the 
creation of a security right over the crypto asset, e.g., a lien or a 
pledge, which necessarily requires some type of legal right to the 
asset. We can leave it to the applicable tort, contract, or security 
law whether to call this status “property,” “possession,” or by 
another term. What matters is that the factual position of the 
holder of the private key receives protection by the law. 
On a theoretical level, it may seem unsatisfying to grant 
protection to someone who cannot prove that he has acquired 
ownership under an applicable national law. What the “holder” 
of the bitcoin has is merely the private key, i.e., a string of 
numbers produced by an algorithm. Yet to protect such 
information is not without parallels. For instance, personal data 
and business secrets are protected as well,137 despite the fact 
that they do not relate to physical objects and that they can be 
infinitely multiplied. There is consensus that they merit 
protection independently of their precise legal categorization 
and their invisibility in the real world.138 These examples 
forcefully demonstrate that the protection by private law can go 
beyond traditional conceptions of property in physical objects. 
One should accept the private key as being reserved or “private” 
only to the holder. This protection must be independent of any 
showing of legal title. The mere factual situation that the private 
key was created for some person should suffice as a basis for a 
claim of return.  
2. THE CASE OF HACKED OR ILLEGALLY OBTAINED CRYPTO 
ASSETS 
This article argues that the results obtained by the 
operation of DLT merit legal protection independently of how 
they are qualified under national law. It is, however, necessary 
to make an exception: The holder of the cryptocurrency or other 
virtual asset should not be able to rely on his position recorded 
on the blockchain where it can be proven in a court of law that 
                                                          
 137. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE 
§§1798.100–.199 (Deering 2019) (requiring protection of personal data); See also 
Rivendell Forest Prods. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 28 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(discussing trade secrets and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, a widely adopted 
uniform law which protects business secrets). 
 138. See, e.g., Fairfield, supra note 3, at 849–54; Bayern, supra note 36, at 
29; Zaytoun, supra note 136, at 401. 
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he has obtained the private key without the will of the former 
holder. This exception applies to cases in which the holder of the 
private key has hacked or copied the private key of another 
person and carried out a transfer to himself.139 
In this case, a mere obligation to retransfer would be 
insufficient. This can be illustrated by the case of bankruptcy: If 
the “stolen” crypto assets—i.e. the new private keys—were 
deemed to belong to the hacker, they would fall into the hacker’s 
bankruptcy estate.140 The former holder would merely have a 
claim against the bankruptcy administrator, which he would 
have to pursue as a creditor in the ordinary bankruptcy 
proceedings. This means that he would have no guarantee of 
getting his assets back even if he could prove the wrongdoing. 
The other creditors in the insolvency proceedings should not, 
however, benefit from the illegal maneuvers of the insolvent 
debtor. The only way to avoid this result is to consider the holder 
as lacking legal title to the assets. 
What if the hacker or fraudster has transferred the crypto 
assets to a recipient who knows about the hack? In this case, the 
result must be the same. The bad faith recipient should not be 
able to rely on his recording on the blockchain. Those who share 
the knowledge of his illegal undertaking deserve no protection. 
The situation is similar to that of the stolen banknote, which has 
been discussed before.141 The thief can only transfer property to 
good faith recipients. 
The same treatment should be applied in case of fraud or 
blackmail. A fraudster does not deserve the protection of the law, 
in line with the old Latin adage “fraus omnia corrumpit” (fraud 
negates everything); nor do the creditors of his bankruptcy 
estate or those who know about the fraudulent obtainment of the 
private key. There is no reason to treat blackmailers and their 
creditors differently. 
It is important not to weaken the blockchain record beyond 
these exceptional situations. Otherwise, one would run the risk 
of paralleling the DLT with a largely futile and inefficient legal 
                                                          
 139. In case the hacker has merely obtained the private key of the victim 
and has not yet used it to do a transfer to himself, the situation is somewhat 
easier. There is no invalid position that the holder could rely on. Yet there may 
be a confusion as to who is the “true holder” of the crypto asset. This should 
obviously be the victim of the hack. 
 140. See discussion infra Section A.3. 
 141. See discussion supra Section A.3. 
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analysis. Beyond a case in which the private key was hacked, 
obtained by fraud, or obtained by blackmail from the defendant, 
there should not be any analysis of the property situation before 
the suit. Where a person has willfully typed the private key into 
a computer, she should not be able to attack the position of the 
recipient. In cases where a person made a mistake or has not 
received a counter performance, she must rely on the reverse 
transfer to vindicate her rights.142 The function of the DLT would 
be greatly compromised if the title of the recipient or third 
parties would depend on the validity of an underlying contract 
or the correct rendering of a counter-performance. Furthermore, 
the onus of proving that the crypto asset has been illegally 
obtained should be on the victim. The transfer should only be 
considered as not having occurred where she can prove that the 
holder of the private key has taken the information from her 
without her consent. 
3. TRANSFERS OUTSIDE THE BLOCKCHAIN 
Further issues raised by the proposal made here concern the 
possibility that crypto assets may be transferred outside the 
blockchain. These issues have been described above as 
“endogenous” problems.143 Consider the example of succession: 
Upon death, legal systems typically vest the ownership of the 
decedent in his representative or heir.144 This legal transfer 
comprises all of the decedent’s assets, thus it should also include 
her crypto assets.145 The transfer happens by mere operation of 
the law without regard to whether the representative or heir has 
knowledge of the private key or access to it.146 This means that, 
legally, a person who is not the holder of the private key must 
nevertheless have a legal right to the crypto assets recorded on 
the blockchain. 
How can such a result be obtained without compromising 
the working of DLT? The easiest solution is to consider the 
crypto assets as the “property” of the holder; since in case of 
death, all property of the decedent vests in the trustee, heir, or 
devisees of testament, the characterization as property would 
                                                          
 142. See discussion supra Section A.3. 
 143. See discussion supra Section A.2.a. 
 144. See supra note 56 and the accompanying text. 
 145. See supra note 57 and the accompanying text. 
 146. Id. 
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explain why the crypto assets now “belong” to the latter. This 
explanation is possible even though the transfer is not analyzed 
in terms of property law. A property qualification may not be 
necessary in those legal systems in which all rights of the 
decedent are transferred to the representative or heir, whether 
they are proprietary, contractual, or other.147 The legal 
construction is ultimately up to the national law governing the 
succession to decide. It suffices to say that the bitcoin were 
assets of the deceased to justify their automatic transfer to his 
representative or heirs. 
Practical problems may occur where the key is not accessible 
to the heirs. If it is, for instance, stored on the office computer of 
the deceased, it may be difficult for the heir or representative to 
dispose of the crypto asset. However, the novelty of the problem 
should not be exaggerated. Similar difficulties arise where 
physical objects are in the possession of third parties, e.g. china 
in the care of the maid or an expensive watch in the hands of a 
nurse. Many legal systems give the successor a claim against the 
third party to turn over the possession to them.148 In the case of 
crypto assets, this entails the duty to provide the private key. 
                                                          
 147. For French law, see CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 724(1) (Fr.) (“Heirs 
designated by legislation have seizin by operation of law of the assets, rights, 
and actions of the deceased.”), For German law, see Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
[BGB] [German Civil Code], Jan. 2, 2002, BGBL. I at 42. § 1922 (Ger.) (“Upon 
the death of a person, that person’s inheritance passes as a whole to one or more 
than one other person. . . .”). An exception applies only to highly personal rights 
such as personality rights, see FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, YVES LEQUETTE & SOPHIE 
GAUDEMET, DROIT CIVIL. LES SUCCESSIONS. LES LIBÉRALITÉS margin no. 50 
[2013], but this exception is not applicable to crypto assets. 
 148. Some legal systems still allow the Roman hereditatis petitio, i.e. the 
claim of the heir against the possessor of any object belonging to the estate. See, 
e.g., Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], § 2018 (Ger.) (“The heir may 
request every person who, on the basis of a right of succession that he does not 
really have, has acquired something from the inheritance (possessor of the 
inheritance) to surrender the item or items acquired.”) Others follow the 
doctrine “le mort saisit le vif” developed by the ius commune, according to which 
the heirs are considered to be the owners and possessors of the estate at the 
moment of ownership. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 936 (1997) (“The 
possession of the decedent is transferred to his successors, whether testate or 
intestate, and if testate, whether particular, general, or universal legatees. A 
universal successor continues the possession of the decedent with all its 
advantages and defects, and with no alteration in the nature of the possession. 
A particular successor may commence a new possession for purposes of 
acquisitive prescription.”); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 724(1) (Fr.) In 
both cases, the heir has a cause of action against any person that possesses an 
object belonging to the estate. 
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However, a pure duty of information would not suffice. One must 
also fight the risk that the person in possession of the private 
key first uses it for a self-interested transfer before handing it 
over to the heir or representative. This can easily be achieved by 
supplementing the obligation to transfer the private key with 
the obligation to abstain from any use, disposition, or sharing of 
the information with third parties. 
Similar obligations as those in succession cases also arise in 
other cases in which a party steps into the shoes of another. As 
illustrations, one may think about the new company in a merger 
transaction or the bankruptcy administrator after the opening 
of a bankruptcy proceeding. In both of these cases, it is necessary 
to provide the successor with a legal claim against the person 
that currently holds the private key and thus the information 
necessary to dispose of and otherwise administer the crypto 
asset. 
4. APPLICABLE LAW 
One may ask which legal system provides for all of these 
consequences. Is it necessary to create a proper blockchain 
regime for them? 
The answer is no. One may derive the protection in cases of 
erroneous transfers by using the normal conflict rules for unjust 
enrichment, which refer, inter alia, to the place of the 
enrichment.149 Where problems under a contract occur, the 
obligation to perform a reverse transaction will result from the 
applicable contract law.150 In the case of hacking, blackmail, or 
                                                          
 149. See, e.g., Council Regulation 593/2008, On the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, art. 10. (stating that the existence 
and validity of a contract are determined by the law which would govern it if 
the contract or term were valid); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 221(2)(b)(1971) (providing that, for restitution, the local law of the state with 
the most significant relationship to the particular issue is used to determine 
rights and liabilities of the parties for that issue and “the place where the 
benefit or enrichment was received” can be used to determine which state has 
the most significant relationship to the issue); HAY ET AL., supra note 14, at 
1218–22 (discussing choice-of-law alternatives for preexisting contractual 
relationships). 
 150. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 54(2)(a) (2008) (“Rescission requires a mutual restoration and 
accounting in which each party restores property received from the other, to the 
extent such restoration is feasible . . . .”). 
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fraud the transfer has no legal effect.151 Nevertheless, the victim 
may claim the restoration of the private key under tort law.152 
The applicable national law can be determined according to the 
ordinary conflict-of-laws rules, which point to the place of the 
tort.153 National law is capable of protecting positions deriving 
from the blockchain, as is demonstrated by the fact that other 
incorporeal rights are also protected, such as personal data154 or 
business secrets.155 Where a national law does not currently 
afford similar protection to crypto assets, it needs to be 
developed further in this direction. Otherwise, the citizens of the 
country in question will be in danger of losing their crypto assets 
due to hacking, fraud, or coercion.156 
The consequences of a succession, merger, or bankruptcy 
proceeding are determined by the applicable national law. This 
                                                          
 151. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175–76 (1981) 
(stating that a “threat to make public embarrassing information concerning the 
recipient unless he makes a proposed contract” may result in a voidable 
contract, along with contracts induced by fraud or misrepresentation). 
 152. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 922 (1979) (discussing the 
return of converted chattel); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965) 
(defining conversion). 
 153. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) 
(“The rights and liabilities of parties with respect to an issue in tort are based 
on the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most 
significant relationship to the occurrence and parties . . . .”). 
 154. See, e.g., Council Regulation 2016/679, On the Protection of Natural 
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and On the Free 
Movement of Such Data, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (instituting the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) with the purpose to “respect [the] fundamental 
rights and freedoms [of natural persons], in particular their right to the 
protection of personal data”). 
 155. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (2016) (“An owner of a trade secret that 
is misappropriated may bring a civil action under this subsection if the trade 
secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate 
or foreign commerce.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Timothy G. Massad, It’s Time to Strengthen the Regulation of 
Crypto-Assets, ECON. STUD. AT BROOKINGS, Mar. 2019, at 2, available from 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Timothy-Massad-Its 
-Time-to-Strengthen-the-Regulation-of-Crypto-Assets-2.pdf (“There is a gap in 
the regulation of crypto-assets that Congress needs to fix. The gap is 
contributing to fraud and weak investor protection in the distribution and 
trading of crypto-assets.”); cf. Ivan Novikov, The Three Layers of Crypto 
Security, FORBES (May 3, 2018, 7:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites 
/forbestechcouncil/2018/05/03/the-three-layers-of-cryptocurrency 
-security/#2680bb6029aa (recommending methods of protecting cryptocurrency 
assets). 
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law can be determined using the normal conflict rules.157 For 
instance, the law applicable to succession is usually determined 
based on the nationality or habitual residence of the deceased,158 
the law applicable to mergers by the law of the entities in 
question,159 and the law applicable to bankruptcies by the law of 
the country in which the bankruptcy proceedings are opened.160 
Where this law contains a provision on universal transfers, it 
should also be applied to the private keys of blockchain assets. 
Where it does not contain such a provision, the legal issue does 
not arise. 
Some confusion may still arise due to the fact that the 
conflict rules regarding all of these issues are not the same 
around the world. However, this is not unusual. The same issue 
arises all the time in other situations as well.161 
More problematic is that national laws may take a view that 
is different from the one in this article. In particular, they may 
not accept DLT as a fact and try to double it with an analysis of 
the legal “validity” of blockchain transfers under their property 
law.162 A good way to provide more certainty would be an 
international text that endows a blockchain record with some 
legal protection.163 It could also provide for the exceptions in case 
                                                          
 157. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) 
(discussing that the rights and liabilities of parties with respect to an issue of 
tort are based on the local law that has the most significant relationship to the 
occurrence and parties). 
 158. See, e.g., id. at § 260 (“The devolution of interests in movables upon 
intestacy is determined by the law that would be applied by the courts of the 
state where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death.”). 
 159. See, e.g., id. at § 302 (discussing the applicable law with respect to 
powers and liabilities of corporations). 
 160. See, e.g., CLARK A. NICHOLS ET AL., CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL 
PROCEDURE § 2:192 (3rd ed. 2019) (“American courts have consistently 
recognized the interest of foreign courts in liquidating or winding up the affairs 
of their own domestic business entities.”). 
 161. See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, International Conflict of Laws and 
the New Conflicts Restatement, 27 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 361, 374–76 
(discussing application of foreign comity in a suit filed in California for a 
bombing that occurred in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic). 
 162. Cf. Katie Szilagyi, A Bundle of Blockchains? Digitally Disrupting 
Property Law, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 24–28 (arguing that blockchain should be 
treated as property under conventional property law and arguing that using a 
Hegelian property framework to validate a property owner’s status with respect 
to the property is incompatible with Bitcoin). 
 163. See Jonathan Cardenas, The Rise of the Crypto Asset Investment Fund: 
An Overview of the Crypto Fund Ecosystem, in 1 BLOCKCHAIN & 
CRYPTOCURRENCY 149, 150 (Josias Dewey ed. 2019) (stating that institutions 
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of theft, blackmail, and fraud that have been advocated here. 
Such an international text could take the form of a convention, 
a legislative guide, or a model law. Possible fora could be the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, UNIDROIT in 
Rome, or UNCITRAL in Vienna. The treatment of these issues 
by one of these international fora would be in line with the global 
nature of DLT. As long as they have not acted, one must hope for 
the reasonableness of national courts in applying their national 
law to blockchain transfers. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has proven that it is possible to maintain the 
hallmarks of DLT, namely its autonomy, nonrepudiability, and 
a-nationality, while arriving at just and socially acceptable 
outcomes from a legal perspective. This symbiosis has been 
achieved by respecting the results of blockchain transfer as a 
fact and imposing an obligation for a reverse transfer in case 
they are incompatible with the requirements of justice. The 
correction that is necessary from a legal perspective is thus done 
in a form that is compatible with the technology. 
Unless it can be proven that such a corrective obligation 
exists, the distribution of assets foreseen by the technology 
should be presumed to be legitimate. The private key should 
therefore be legally protected against hacking, fraud, coercion, 
or other forms of misappropriation. These cases can be solved by 
using the general rules of tort law.164 There is thus no need to 
define a national law governing the blockchain or developing a 
special lex cryptographica. 
The solution proposed here can also solve the problem of 
crypto asset transfers outside of the blockchain (e.g., in case of a 
succession). The transfer is done by virtue of the applicable law. 
Any person that is illegally in possession of the private key is 
under an obligation to turn over the key to the legitimate 
successor and desist from any use. 
In sum, there is no law applying to the blockchain 
transaction as such. Yet there are laws surrounding it, like 
                                                          
around the world are attempting to develop international norms for blockchains 
and the “crypto ecosystem”). 
 164. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 922 (1979) (discussing 
return of converted chattel); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965) 
(explaining what constitutes conversion); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 223 
(1934) (describing ways of committing conversion). 
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contract law, tort law, or succession law. These laws must accept 
the social reality that is created by the blockchain transfer. They 
should regard such transfer as a fact, but not necessarily as 
conclusive with regard to the legal situation. Law as a normative 
system has the power to require reverse transfers. Indeed, it 
must use this power where injustice looms. But otherwise, it 
should abstain from interfering with the functioning of the self-
contained transfer system that is DLT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
